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I. INTRODUCTION
Michael Mahon owns a large collection of software for the Apple II computer,
a popular personal computer in the 1980s.1 He wants to preserve his collection
and make it available to others, because, as he states, "it is of considerable
historical interest, since it chronicles the development of personal computer
technologies and markets prior to the modern era, dominated by PCs and Macs." 2
Because copyright law prohibits reproduction even for personal preservation,
however, Mahon is prevented from making a backup copy of the software in his
collection without permission from the copyright owner.3 Unfortunately,
determining the copyright owner is difficult, if not impossible, as many of the
companies that sold software in the 1980s have gone out of business and the
copyright owners are often unreachable.'
Time is running out for the
preservation of his collection; some of his disks have already become unreadable,
and the copy of the software contained therein lost forever.'
Suzanne White Junod is a historian with the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).6 To celebrate the FDA's centennial in 2006, the agency
came up with the idea of putting together a book of historical cartoons dating
back to the early years of the twentieth century.7 The project had to be
abandoned, however, as the historians at the agency realized that even with legal
help it was simply-not cost-efficient to attempt to follow the trail of copyright
ownership for each cartoon.'
Cornell University's A.R. Mann Library has for the past ten years been
involved in a digitization project called The Core Historical Literature of

Comment of Michael J. Mahon to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int'l Affairs,
Copyright Office (Mar. 8,2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0233-Mahon.
pdf.
2 Id.
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000) (stating that the copyright owner has the exclusive right "to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies"); Barbara Ringer & Hamish Sandison, United States of
America, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 563, 584 (Stephen M.
Stewart ed., 2d ed. 1989) (noting that the broad language of the 1976 Copyright Act covers
unauthorized reproduction of computer programs, and that "a single reproduction for private
purposes with no intention to reproduce further copies can be regarded as infringing').
4 Mahon, supra note 1.
5id
6 Comment ofSuzanne WhiteJunod, Ph.D., toJule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int'l
Affairs, Copyright Office (Mar. 2,2005), http://www.copytight.gov/orphan/ comments/OW0161Junod.pdf.
7Id.

8 Id.
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Agriculture (CHLA).9 The materials provided in the CHLA "document the
experience of the individual farm family, the establishment and evolution of farm
communities, the pressures affecting rural culture, and the shifting and evolution
in rural culture in response to national and world events."10 Of the approximately
one thousand works the Library determined were of uncertain copyright status,
397 were found to be still under copyright." Of those 397 titles, the Library was
unable to resolve copyright issues for 198.12 The unresolved copyright issues
resulted from either an inability to locate the author or publisher to situations
where a potential owner was located, but either did not response or denied
copyright ownership. The Library has estimated that over $50,000 in staff time
has been spent in attempting to clarify the copyright status and obtain permission
to use these works.' 3 Because the Library was unable to identify or contact the
copyright owners to secure permission to use these works, they have been
excluded from the CHIA database. 4
Problems such as these have skyrocketed in recent years as copyright terms
lengthened and the scope of copyright expanded to include many newer
categories of works that lose their value rapidly. 5 These complex situations are
known as problems with "orphaned works."' 6 An orphaned work is a work that
is still protected by copyright, but that a potential user cannot obtain permission
to use because she is unable to either identify or locate the copyright owner.'" In
his dissent from the Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcrof, Justice Stephen Breyer
noted that lengthened copyright terms under the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA) "can inhibit or prevent the use of old works (particularly those without

Comment of Miriam M. Nesbit, Legislative Counsel, Am. Library Ass'n, to Jule L. Sigall,
Assoc. Register for Policy & Int'l Affairs, Copyright Office, at 2 (Mar. 25, 2005), http://www.
copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0658-LCA.pdf.
"OAbout The Core Historical Literature of Agriculture (CHLA): Background of This Collection
(Jan. 2005), http://chla.library.cornell.edu/c/chla/about.html.
" Nesbit, supra note 9, at 3.
12 Id.
1" Comment of Sarah E. Thomas, Carl A. Kroch Univ. Librarian, Cornell Univ. Library, tojule
L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int'l Affairs, Copyright Office, at 2 (Mar. 23, 2005), http://
www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0569-Thomas.pdf.
14

Id.

" See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
16 See Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005) (defining orphan works as
"copyrighted works whose owners are difficult or even impossible to locate").
17 Id. The term may originate in a statement made by Jack Valenti, President of the Motion
Picture Association of America, in hearings before Congress pursuant to the 1995 Copyright Term
Extension Act. See The CopyrightTerm Extension Act of 1995: Hearingon S. 483 Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciay, 104th Cong. 42 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of Jack Valenti)
("Whatever work is not owned is a work that no one protects and preserve[s].... A public domain
work is an orphan.').
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commercial value)." ' Justice Breyer recognized that lengthened copyright terms
created a greater likelihood of copyright ownership becoming unstable and
confusing for potential users, because as time passes copyright status becomes
more likely to be either prohibitively expensive or impossible to determine.' 9
The duration of copyright now threatens to outstrip not only the lives of the
author and the first generation of heirs, but also the lifespan of the very material
upon which many copyrighted works are housed. In 1994, the Librarian of
Congress emphasized the problems posed by unstable, deteriorating film stock
from the early days of motion pictures; 0 the problem is even more pressing today.
As long as it remains unprofitable for motion picture companies to undertake
comprehensive preservation strategies that include films other than the standard
Hollywood feature film, these works will continue to deteriorate and be lost
forever.2' Although organizations across the country are willing to take on the
task of restoring and preserving these lesser-known, but historically and culturally
important films, they are hesitant to do so as long as the legality of their use is in
22
question.
Deteriorating materials are an even greater problem for owners of computer
software. A computer disk from the 1970s and 1980s will only be readable for ten
to thirty years,' a fraction of the current term of copyright protection. 24 Another
issue is that of format. Software is often designed to run on a specific operating
system.
Once the system is superseded, it is virtually impossible to run the

I" Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

19Id.
2' SeeJAMES H. BILLINGTON, Preface to REDEFINING FILM PRESERVATION: A NATIONAL PLAN
(1994), http://www.loc.gov/film/plan.html ("Of America's feature films of the 1920s fewer than
20% survive; and for the 1910s, the survival rate falls to half that.").
21 See Brief for Hal Roach Studios & Michael Agee as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at
14-18, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) (arguing that films in most urgent need
of preservation are those with less economic value and which are therefore not protected by
commercial interests).
' See, e.g., Comment of Mike Dalby, Ph.D., Staff Research Assoc., Univ. of Cal., tojule L. Sigall,
Assoc. Register for Policy & Int'l Affairs, Copyright Office (Mar. 17,2005), http://www.copyright.
gov/orphan/comments/OW213-Dalbey.pdf (relating that his university owns an extensive
collection of orphaned 16mm films, which are deteriorating but which the campus media center will
not convert to DVD without authorization).
3 Simon Carless, PreservingYour Games, GAME DEVELOPER, Apr. 1, 2004, at 72.
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (stating that the term of copyright for works created after
January 1, 1978 is "the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death").
' See Greg Costikyan, New Front in the Copynght Wars: Out-of-PrintComputer Games, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 2000, at G1 ("Game preservation is in worse shape. Hardware and operating systems
come and go. If you have a game designed for an Apple II, you will have a hard time figuring out
how to run it.").
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software without creating a system emulator.26 While repealing the CTEA and
shortening copyright terms will likely help with works that lose value over a long
period of time and deteriorate slowly, such as films, music, and books, these
measures will do little to solve theproblems posed by software deterioration.
Small museums, libraries, and archives across the country contain treasuretroves of information which they would like to make available to the public, but
which they cannot because the rights holders cannot be located in order to obtain
permission."v Scholars and researchers who wish to make use of a work in order
to illuminate our cultural heritage cannot do so because they are unable to
determine and locate the rights holders.2" Creators of new works who wish to
build upon the work of others cannot do so because they cannot locate the rights
holders.2" Present limitations on access to orphaned works may also compromise
the legal system, as patent claims cannot be properly prosecuted without full
access to the cultural record.' These problems can only be solved by a system
that recognizes that works lose value and are abandoned prior to the expiration
of copyright, and therefore provides adequate means by which access to these
works can be obtained. The current American copyright system does not provide

SId. See Andrew Leung, Video Game Emulation and the Law, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. NOTES
12, http://www.lawtechjournal.com/notes/2002/12_020819jeung.php ("Video game emulators
are software that emulates a video game console's hardware and firmware on a PC. This allows the
PC user to play games for the emulated console on the PC."). Although the Ninth Circuit found
that copying of the basic input-output system (BIOS) for the Sony Playstation in the course of
creating an emulator was fair use, Sony CompuerEntm't,Inc. v. Connecix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th
Cir. 2000), other courts have held that creation of an emulator was likely to be found to be copyright
infringement, see Control Data Sys., Inc. v. Infoware, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1316, 1316-17 (D. Minn.
1995) (granting a preliminary injunction to a plaintiff where the defendant created an emulator).
27 See, e.g., Comment of Tracey Baker, Assistant Head of Reference, Minn. Historical Soc'y, to
Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int'l Affairs, Copyright Office (Mar. 10, 2005), http://
www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0253-BakerT.pdf (relating that her library owns many
historical films with little or no credit information, which they are unable to make available to
researchers).
28 See Hearng, supra note 17, at 150 (statement of Dennis J. Karjala) (noting that because of the
complexities of "tracking down and obtaining permission from all those who by now may have a
partial interest in the copyright, a hapless historian will be tempted to pick a subject that poses fewer
obstacles and annoyances').
29 See, e.g., Comment of Robert Hill, to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int'l Affairs,
Copyright Office (Mar. 2,2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW01 59-Hill.pdf
(noting the author's inability to use material to create new works of animation); Comment ofJoshua,
to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc., Register for Policy & Int'l Affairs, the Copyright Office, http://www.
copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0266-Joshua.pdf (citing his difficulty with locating copyright
owners for works to be used in multimedia collage).
30 Dierdre K. Mulligan & Jason M. Schultz, Negkcting the NationalMemogy: How Copyright Term
Extensions Compromise the Development of DigitalArrhives, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 451, 454-55
(2002).
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for this situation, but may be modified to address the problems posed by
orphaned works without a substantial shift in the theoretical basis behind
contemporary copyright law.
The problems engendered by ever-increasing numbers of orphaned works
have recently received attention from both copyright scholars and the Copyright
Office. After his defeat in Eldred, Lawrence Lessig raised the issue of orphan
works in a challenge to the constitutionality of the CTEA, Kahle v. Ashcrof.31
Senator Orrin Hatch asked the Copyright Office to study the issue, and in early
2005 the Copyright Office issued a call for initial comments on the issues relating
to orphaned works.32 After a call for reply comments, the Copyright Office held
roundtable discussions on the subject in the summer of 2005, resulting in the
release of a report containing proposed statutory language in early 2006. 33
This Note first explores the factors that have converged to create orphaned
works and the means by which access to orphaned works may be provided by
modest changes to our current system of copyright protection. This Note will
then evaluate the potential solutions that have been advanced to determine their
potential efficacy and feasibility. Part II will provide an overview of the copyright
system and the origin and nature of the problems posed by orphaned works. Part
III will then evaluate several proposed methods by which a work that has been
determined to be orphaned may be made available for use. These can be divided
into two major types: solutions that rely upon a change in the copyright term and
solutions that require a case-by-case, ad hoc determination. Part IV will present
the case for a compulsory licensing system for orphaned works, an alternative
solution which is efficient, feasible, and easily implemented. Finally, Part V will
conclude with a comparison of this proposal to those previously offered.
II. BACKGROUND

The Constitution provides that in order to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts" Congress shall have the power to secure "for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."34 From this beginning, copyright law has steadily expanded both
in scope and in duration. Congress has interpreted this language to provide
protection not only for what the general public traditionally views as copyrightable

31No. C-04-1127 MMC, 2004 WL 2663157 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004).

1-2
at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/

32 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS

(2006) [hereinafter

REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS], available

orphan-report-fifll.pdf.
33 I
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, S

8.
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material, such as works of fiction, film, and art, but also for maps, photographs,
computer software, architecture, and nonfiction works.3 5 Further, the scope of
copyright protection now encompasses not only the prohibition on reproduction
inherent in the term "copyright," but other
affiliated rights of use, such as rights
36
of adaptation, displayi and performance.
The nature of U.S. copyright law has also been heavily influenced by the
United States' efforts to comply with the terms of the Berne Convention. 37 The
Berne Convention' requires that the "enjoyment and the exercise" of rights
associated with copyright "shall not be subject to any formality,"38 and that the
term of copyright protection be "the life of the author and fifty years after his
death. '39 Berne compliance has resulted in a dramatic shift in copyright law,
which has been described as a shift from a "conditional copyright" system, in
which the owner must take affirmative steps to secure copyright protection, to an
"unconditional copyright" system, in which
all creative work is automatically
4
copyrighted at the moment of fixation. 0
The broad scope, lengthy duration, and shifting requirements (orlack thereof)
for copyright protection in the United States all assist in creating a class of
orphaned works. Although orphaning is an inevitable result of a standardized
copyright system, the particulars of American copyright law combine to create a
unique environment in which users are beset on all sides by obstacles to the use
of older works of limited value.
A. SCOPE OF PROTECTION

American copyright law confers several rights upon the rights holder, who
may be the author of the work, the author's employer under the often
complicated work-for-hire doctrine, or a transferee, including a devisee of a will
or an heir under intestacy law.4' The author may also contract away his copyright
in a particular work.42 The reproduction right protects the author against
unauthorized copying of his work, even if that copying is for non-commercial,

3517 U.S.C. %4101-102 (2000).
36 Id §

106.

37 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMNER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01 (2006).

' Paris Act relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
art. 5(2),July 24,1971, S.TREATY DOC. No. 99-27,1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
3 Id. art. 7(2).
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aiZJing Copyright,57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 488 (2004).
41 Ringer & Sandison, supra note 3, at 612-19.
42 See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2000) (allowing for transfer of copyright by a written instrument signed

by the copyright owner).
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archival purposes. 43 Certain protections for libraries wishing to archive works in
their collections are available,' but archival copying is generally prohibited.45 In
addition, unauthorized copying of a work as a part of the process of creating a
non-infringing work has been held to be a violation of the reproduction right.'
Other rights conferred include the right to control public distribution, display, and
performance of the work.
Copyright protection also provides the right to
control adaptation of a work, often classified as the right to control the creation
of "derivative works."' a' A derivative work is one which incorporates or builds
upon the original, copyrighted work.49
Several necessary checks on the scope of these rights exist. The fair use
doctrine allows for the reproduction, display, performance, or adaptation of a
copyrighted work when that use is determined to either have little effect on the
market for the original work or to be of great social benefit.5 0 The first sale
doctrine restricts the power of the distribution right, cutting off the right to
control distribution of a particular copy after it has been sold to a consumer."
After the "first sale," the consumer may freely resell the copy.5 2 Compulsory
licenses for cable television broadcasting 3 and nondramatic musical works 4 allow
the reuse of copyrighted works upon payment of a predetermined royalty and
e.liinate the need to negotiate with the copyright owner for permission. 5
B. DURATION OF PROTECTION

More marked than the expansion of the rights of the copyright owner is the
expansion of the length of copyright protection. The 1790 Copyright Act echoed
the English Statute of Anne in granting authors an initial fourteen-year term of

43 2 NIMMER & NIMMER,

supra note 37, § 8.02[C.
4 See 17 U.S.C. §108 (stating that certain types of reproduction and distribution by libraries and
archives are not constitute copyright infringement).
45 See 2 NIMMER & NnrAfR, srpranote 37, § 8.02[q (stating that reproduction is infringement,
even if for purely personal purposes and with no distribution).
' Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871,876 (1986) (noting that copyright
law "prohibits the creation of copies, even if the creator considers those copies mere interim steps
toward some final goal").
47 17 U.S.C. 5106.
4 Id.
41 17 U.S.C. 5101.
10 17 U.S.C. 5 107; 4 NIMER & NIMMER, supm note 37, § 13.05.
11 17 U.S.C. 5109.
52 Id.

51 17 U.S.C.

111.

s4Id. § 115.
" See discussion infra Part IV.
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protection with the possibility of a fourteen-year renewal term.16 In 1831 the
length of the initial term was doubled to twenty-eight years, providing a potential
forty-two years of protection. 7 The 1909 Copyright Act doubled the renewal
term, resulting in twenty-eight year initial and renewal terms.5" The term of
protection was expanded again in 1962 by another nineteen years as Congress
considered moving to a different term of protection in order to comply with the
Berne Convention.59 Congress shifted to the term of protection required by the
Berne Convention with the 1976 Act, one based not on the date of creation of the
work but on the life of the author, mandating that copyright last the life of the
author plus fifty years for all works created on or afterJanuary 1, 1978.60 Worksfor-hire and works by corporate authors were granted seventy-five years of
protection if published; otherwise, they were protected for one hundred years
from the date of creation. 6' However, as this change in duration did not apply,
works created prior to 1978 were still subject to the 1909 Act twenty-eight year
initial and renewal terms, as well as the. 1962 Act extension. 62 In 1992, Congress
automated renewal of works created from 1964 to 1977, creating a category of
works for which the copyright owner did not have
to take active measures to
63
retain copyright protection under the 1909 Act.
While the United States was systematically expanding copyright duration in
order to standardize its duration with the rest of the world, the European Union
was also expanding its term of copyright protection. The adoption of the
European Council Directive mandated that European Union countries follow
what came to be known as "the rule of the lesser term. '64 The Directive required
that the work in question be protected by the shortest term possible, whether that
be the term in the work's country of origin or in the country in which protection

-6 ROBERT L. BARD & LEWIS KuRIANTzIcK, COPYRIGHT DURATION: DURATION, TERM
EXTENSION, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE MAKING OF COPYRIGHT PoLIcY 7 (1999).
57

Id

58 Id.

"' Kenneth D. Crews, Copyigbt Duration and the ProgressiveDegeneration of a Consitutional Doctine,
55 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 189, 209 (2005).
60
Id
6, See id.
at 215 (noting that the current terms of protection under the CTEA are 95 and 120
years, respectively).
62 Id at 219.
63 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, S 9.05[A] [2].
6 See Council Directive 93/98, art. 7(1), 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EEC) (providing that, when the
country of origin and the author of the work are not members of the European Community, "the
term of protection granted by the Member States shall expire on the date of expiry of the protection
granted in the country of origin of the work, but may not exceed" the term set by Article 1, the life
of the author plus seventy years).
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is sought.6" The result was that American works were protected for the American
life plus fifty years term rather than the European life plus seventy years term.66
Congress passed the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) in 1998 to address
this perceived inequity, extending all existing and future copyright terms by an
additional twenty years."
Currently, most works created after 1978 are protected automatically for the
life of the author plus seventy years.68 All works-for-hire and works created by
corporate authors are protected for ninety-five years.6 9 As a result, almost all
works created after 1923 are protected by copyright until 2018.70
Critics of the CTEA cite the increase in the number of orphaned works as a
major argument against term extension. 71 Although the number of works
orphaned rises as time passes, the problem is not confined to the final twenty
years of the current term. Justice Breyer noted this precise problem in 1970 in
arguing against the 1976 Act's life plus fifty years term:
As time passes persons wishing to reproduce old articles, books,
designs, or other writings find it progressively harder to find the
copyright owner to secure permission-particularly when copying
is necessary because, for example, a book is out of print. The
owner may have moved, gone out of business, sold his copyright,
or died. 2
The problem today is not limited to "old books," however. The rapid rate of
technological change in the computer industry often results in computer software
being orphaned after only a few months or years, giving rise to a category of out-

65

Id.

66 Id
67

Id.

' Crews, supra note 59, at 193.
69 Id.
70 The exceptions are works that were created between 1923 and 1964 and whose copyrights
were not renewed at the end of the initial term of protection. See supra notes 58-63 and
accompanying text.
71 See, e.g., Crews, supra note 59, at 192 (stating that "[w]hen the expiration of a copyright is
undeterminable, the public domain suffers"); Jane C. Ginsburg et al., The Constitutiona0of Copyright
Term Extension: HowLong is Too Long?, 18 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 666 (2000) (stating that
the CTEA would work to increase the number of orphan works in need of restoration); Michael
Jones, Eldred v. Ashcroft: The Constituiona'ey of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 85 (2004).
72 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 326 (1970).
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of-print computer programs known as "abandonware." 73 Computer software
loses the majority of its economic value within the first two years of its
existence. 4 If the primary purpose of modern copyright law is to grant an
economic incentive to spur further creation, a copyright term of two years would
arguably provide sufficient protection. s
Despite evidence that many copyrighted works may lose economic value more
rapidly than in the past, the term of copyright protection has increased. The
result of the lengthening of copyright terms, therefore, absent a corresponding
increase in the length of time for which the average copyrighted work retains its
commercial value, is an increase in the rate of abandonment. It is unlikely that
there is an increase in the length of time a work remains commercially viable;
empirical evidence that the number of works abandoned has only increased along
with the duration of copyrights.7 6 Given that the CTEA increases the term of
copyright protection by twenty years in exchange for a nominal increase in
copyright value,'7 the practical effect of the CTEA is to grant additional copyright
protection to owners at the very time when they are least likely to maintain their
work.7 8 As such, the CTEA provides no measurable incentive to owners and has
no practical effect except the prevention of use by the public.
While the rate of orphaning increases as the copyright term lengthens, a
certain amount of orphaning is also a necessary result of standardized copyright
durations. Of the traditional purposes underlying intellectual property law,

13 See Eric Goldman, A Road to No WareZ: The No Electronic Theft Act and CriminalCopyrigbt
Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 405 (2003) (defining abandonware as "out-of-print software or
games"). Because of the perception that works over a few years old are unlikely to be maintained
because they are valueless, several user-generated definitions of abandonware apply the term to all
software over two or three years old. See The Abandonware Network, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.abware.net/faq.php (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
71 See Lawrence D. Graham & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Economical#Efficient Treatment ofComputer
Software: Reverse Engineering Protection,andDisosure,22RUTGERS COMPUTER &TECH. L.J. 61,69 n.32
(1996) (stating that, in the computer industry, "a new product becomes antiquated in less than two
years').
" See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the PlayingField: Addressing InformationDistortionandAymmetry in the
TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REv. 249, 288 (2003) (noting that "[a] regime tailored to provide optimal
incentives for the creation of software would probably provide rights lasting no longer than the
average commercial life of software (by some estimates, as short as nine months to two years)").
76 See Mulligan & Schultz, supra note 30, at 459 ("In the year 1930, 10,027 books were published
in the United States. In 2001, all but 174 of these tides are out of print.').
77 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,256 (2003) (BreyerJ., dissenting) (noting that the rime8
discounted value of the CTEA-extended copyright term is more than 99. % of the value of
perpetual protection).
71 See Mulligan & Schultz, supra note 30, at 458 ("If ninety-six percent of owners did not care
enough to renew their copyrights after twenty-eight years, there is no reason to expect that when
handed decades of additional, unsought 'protection' they will become devoted caretakers.').
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proponents of recent term extensions rely most heavily upon the economic
incentive argument to justify lengthening copyright terms."9 The economic
incentive argument posits that the author will not create unless he (and now his
family, including successor generations) will receive an economic benefit from his
creation." The argument has historic roots; Lord Macaulay once famously
observed that "[f]or the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil
ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the
good."'" More recently, Lawrence Lessig has argued that copyrights should
endure only as long as the economic value of the copyrighted work.82 Under the
economic incentive justification, therefore, the length of time we must endure the
"evil" of copyright protection should be determined by viability of the economic
motivation.
The value of a copyright decreases markedly over the life of a copyright term.
A 1998 Congressional Research Service study found that only a small percentage
of works had an economically viable life approaching seventy-five years.83 If it is
true that economic motivation is necessary to spur creativity, then a corollary
must also be true: once the economic value of a copyright is exhausted, the
motivation to maintain the work disappears. As the value of a copyright falls, the
apathy of the owner rises, as do the number of works that are orphaned.
If we accept that interest in copyrighted works is only maintained as long as
an economic incentive exists, then orphaned works will exist no matter what the
duration of the copyright term. Copyright terms are standardized by necessity;
copyright values, however, vary individually. When a standardized term is
imposed upon works whose value varies individually, the ideal term of protection
must inevitably be only approximate. If the rate at which works entered the
public domain through failure to renew under the 1909 Act indicated the rate at
which those works lost value (and thus lost the interest of the copyright owner,
resulting in the failure to renew), then evidence shows that most works lose the
value that provides the economic motivation to create and preserve these works
within the first twenty-eight years of protection.' 4 Further, the rate at which a

" JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 79-80 (2001).
80 Id.
"I THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, SPEECHES AND LEGAL STUDIES 241 (1900).
82 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A

CONNECTED WORLD 251 (2001) ("[Authors and] creators deserve to receive the benefits of their
creation. But when those benefits stop, what they create should fall into the public domain.").
83

EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION:

ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES 4 (1998).
84

See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REGISTER'S REPORT ON THE

GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 51 (1961), in 8 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
37, at app. 14, at 14-72 ("Experience indicates that the present initial term of 28 years is sufficient
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work loses value varies depending on the type of work.8" The rate at which a
work loses value increases when the work is within a technological field;8 6 many
copyrighted computer programs are therefore abandoned after a few years, as the
rapid rate of technological change renders them obsolete and of limited or no
value.

87

C. REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTION

Copyright protection prior to the 1976 Act was attended by a bevy of
formalities. 88 These formalities created a "conditional copyright" system, which
required authors to take affirmative measures to secure copyright protection for
their works.89 Under this "opt-in" system, a copyright author was often required
to register the work with the Copyright Office in order to gain copyright
protection.9" If a work was not registered and did not bear a proper copyright
notice upon first publication, it was not copyrighted.91 Further, statutory
copyright only attached upon publication of a work; unpublished works were
92
protected by a virtually indefinite term of protection under common law.
Complexity arose in determining what93 sort of distribution counted as a
"publication" Sufficient to require notice.

for the great majority of copyrighted works: less than 15 percent of all registered copyrights are
being renewed at the present time.'; see alro Mulligan & Schultz, supra note 30, at 458 ("[O]ver
ninety-six percent of works from that year fell into the public domain after only twenty-eight years despite the availability of additional copyright protection. Later numbers show that copyright
owners continued to let the overwhelming majority of their works lapse throughout the first part of
the twentieth century.").
8s See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 84, at 51 ("The percentage of renewals varies from
one class of works to another.').
86 See Graham & Zerbe, supra note 74, at 68-69 (stating that "the pace of advancement in the
computer industry has resulted in a very short shelflife for software products).
87 See Steve Tilley, Classic Games Live On: Abandoned Titks Can Often be Found on the Web,
TORONTO SUN, Aug. 15, 2001, at 52 (noting that the "shelf life of a video game ranges anywhere
from a few weeks to a year or two. Once a game is past its prime, the publisher eventually stops
making it.').
88 Sprigman, supra note 40, at 487.
89 Id at 488.
0 LITMAN, supra note 79, at 19 n.2.
91 Id.
92 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a) (2000); Michael B. Landau, Publicaion, 'MusicalCompositions,and the Copyright
Act of 1909: Still Crar AfterAll These Years, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 29, 30-31 (2000).
" See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, § 4.01 (stating that under the 1909 Act, publication
"became a legal word of art, denoting a process much more esoteric than is suggested by the lay
definition of the term').

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2006

13

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 4

J. INTELL PROP.L[

[Vol. 14:145

The 1976 Copyright Act discarded most of these formalities, shifting to an
"opt-out" system that granted copyright protection upon the initial creation and
fixation of a work. 94 Requirements of publication and notice were abandoned in
order to adhere to the terms of the Berne Convention, 9s which mandated that the
"enjoyment and exercise" of copyrights "shall not be subject to any formality. 9 6
Unpublished works'are protected statutorily under the 1976 Act;97 works
protected by common law copyright were offered statutory protection if they
were published prior to December 31, 2002.98
These idiosyncrasies in American copyright law conspire to create orphan
works. The 1976 Act did not apply retroactively; therefore, the often confusing
and counterintuitive renewal and notice provisions of the 1909 Act continue to
affect the copyright status of works created prior to January 1, 1978. 9 The workfor-hire doctrine requires users wishing to determine ownership investigate the
particular context in which the work was created. 100 This situation is further
complicated by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), which restored
many previously expired copyrights for foreign works.'
Yet it is not just the requirement of 1909 Act formalities that creates orphan
works. The abrogation of statutory formalities under the 1976 Act has also
created orphans.'02 Statatory formalities of notice and registration, although
somewhat confusing in practice, allowed for the creation of a formal record of
copyright ownership. 0 3 No such record exists for the vast majority of works
created under the 1976 Act."° Ultimately, ascertaining who is the rightful
copyright owner can be a matter of guesswork. When even one of the facts
necessary for a determination is lost, the user is often left at a dead end, unable
to resolve the question of ownership and unable to obtain permission to use the
work.

10

9' Sprigman, supra note 40, at 494.
95 Id.
96 Berne Convention, supra note 38, art. 5(2).
- See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (stating that copyright subsists in "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression").
98 3 NIMMER & NINMER, smpra note 37, § 9.09[A].
9 Crews, spra note 59, at 199.
100Id
101 17 U.S.C. § 104A.
102 See Mulligan & Schultz, supra note 30, at 457 ("The formalities eliminated the problems of

absent, missing, dead, out of business, or uncaring rights holders, thus providing some balance to
the additional years of protection offered by Congress.").
103

id.

104 Id.; see also REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKs,supra note

32, at 5 (noting that several commentators

advocated a return to recordkeeping as a partial solution to orphaning).
10s See Crews, supra note 59, at 199 ("[lit is also a law that depends upon widely ranging facts that
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Potential users of copyrights often have great difficulty ascertaining the
identity of the correct copyright holder, especially when confronted with several
parties with apparently good claims to ownership. 1 6 As complex as the
ownership problem in these situations can be, however, it is easy to visualize more
difficult dilemmas. When copyrights pass through wills or intestacy statutes,"°7
the devisees or heirs may be either unaware of their ownership or unwilling to
allow use of a work when they become aware of their ownership.'
The
abrogation of statutory formalities under the 1976 Act means that there is often
no record of initial ownership, let alone any record of successive transfers of
ownership to heirs or devisees.' 9 Further, there may be disagreement as to
whether the author even owned the initial copyright to the work, regardless of
who filed the application for copyright."0
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that many scholars and researchers
who wish to make use of a work abandon the search for the true owner when the
transaction costs involved become too high."' Indeed, the transaction costs
involved in attempting to locate and contact potential copyright owners are often
so high that many smaller libraries and museums that own material they wish to
archive or make available to the public do not do so because obtaining permission
is beyond the limits of their budgets and staff capabilities." 2 In this environment,
it is not just the users of the work who suffer; the potential beneficiaries of their
innovation suffer as well.

are often elusive, outside the reach of a private party seeking to apply the law, or simply lost.").
'0oSee Dolman v. Agee, 157 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving confusion between the author's
heirs and the author's employer as to which owned the copyright to the work in question); see
also
Nesbit, supra note 9, at 8 (describing a situation where "the publisher claimed that the artist had the
copyright, while the artist claimed that the publisher had the copyright').
107 See 17 U.S.C. §201 (d)(1) (2000) (stating that copyright ownership "may be bequeathed
by will
or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession").
108 See Cecil C. Kuhne, The Steadit ShrinkingPublic Domain: Ineffidendes ofExising Copyigbt Law
in the Modem Technologv Age, 50 LoY. L. REv. 549, 558 (2004) (noting that "it may be practically
impossible to identify successors in interest to these copyrights" and that "[h]eirs wielding rigid
control and high costs over works long after the original author's death frequently frustrate the
creativity of new authors').
109Mulligan & Schultz, supra note 30, at 456-57.
11

See spra note 106.

See Kuhne, supra note 108, at 549-50 ("It is obvious even to the casual observer that this
search for the copyright owner is often difficult and expensive .... Many who face this daunting
process will eventually give up, leaving the material unread by the public.").
112 See Roundtable Discussion on Orphan Works 56 (Tuesday, Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.
copyright.gov/orphan/transcript/0802LOC.PDF [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion] (noting that
most museums and libraries are "very small and are really run by volunteer staff").
"
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Several solutions to the problems posed by orphaned works have been
suggested over the past few years. These solutions can be divided into two broad
categories: those which rely upon an adjustment to the copyright term and those
that propose a judicial solution by either adjusting existing defenses or creating
new defenses to infringement actions. Although each proposal has its advantages,
each ultimately fails to provide a complete solution to orphan works problems.
A. COPYRIGHT TERM ADJUSTMENTS

1. The Public Domain EnbancementAct. The Public Domain Enhancement Act3
(PDEA) was introduced in Congress in 2003, but it failed to leave committee.'
Under the PDEA, a work would be protected without any action by the copyright
owner for the first fifty years after publication."' In order to obtain the
remainder of the copyright term, however, the copyright owner would be required
to file for renewal and5 pay a nominal renewal fee ($1) for every ten years of
additional protection."
There are several advantages to this proposal. First, it would reverse much of
the damage done by the CTEA. If the copyright owner does not take the minimal
step of renewing copyright after the first fifty years of protection, the work will
enter the public domain. Further, because the potential term of protection
remains the entire life plus seventy years granted by the CT E-rA, fihe PDJEA aIso
addresses the core CTEA concern of term harmonization between the United
Convention's "no
States and the European Union" 6 while adhering to the Berne
7
formalities" requirement for the initial term of protection."
Although the PDEA addresses concerns over the CTEA, its limited nature
prevents it from serving as an adequate solution to many of the particular
dilemmas posed by orphaned works. First, and most importantly, the PDEA
does not provide a mechanism by which potential users can gain permission to

13

Public Domain Enhancement Act of 2003, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003). For a brief

discussion of the legislative action taken on the PDEA by the 108th Congress, see Sprigman, supra
note 40, at 554.
114 H.R. 2601 § 3(c)(1)(a).
115 Id
n6 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
117 Berne Convention, supra note 38, art. 5(2). Although the PDEA does not require formalities
for the initial term of protection, that term is not the term of protection required under the Berne
Convention. Id.art. 7(1). As such, the PDEA may not fully comply with the terms of the Berne
Convention.
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use works orphaned during the first fifty years of copyright protection." 8
Although many films and books may retain their value for a longer period of time,
the impact of this failure would be felt most keenly by users of works that lose
their value rapidly and degrade quickly, such as computer software." 9
Secondly, the effect of the PDEA is to restore an already excessive copyright
term. 20 Empirical evidence showed that earlier this century, the value of
copyrighted works depreciated so rapidly that the majority of works were not
renewed after the initial twenty-eight year term of protection under the 1909
Act.' 2 ' Despite contentions to the contrary, there is no evidence that this has
changed."2 As such, it can be inferred that many works will continue to be
orphaned well within the initial fifty years of copyright protection. The PDEA
provides no mechanism to access these works. Therefore, while the PDEA does
represent an admirable step toward limiting the duration of copyright for most
works, it does not provide the comprehensive solution necessary to adequately
address the orphan works problem.
2. Indefinitel Renewable Copyright. Professor William Landes andJudge Richard
Posner have proposed shifting copyright protection to a short initial copyright
term, such as ten years, which would be indefinitely renewable. 123 This proposal
is attractive on several levels. First, the term of copyright is sufficiently short that
works in unstable media would most likely not have degraded to the point where
they would not be preservable at the end of the initial term of protection; even for
computer software, magnetic media lasts at least ten years.' 24 Second, the short
initial term will place many works that lose their value rapidly in the public
domain at a far greater rate than either the PDEA or constructive abandonment
proposals. The similarly short duration of the renewal terms continues this, as
works will enter the public domain at a rate which can potentially approximate the
rate at which works lose economic value. This will significantly increase the value
of the public domain, especially for works whose commercial and cultural value
is not realized initially.
Professor Christopher Sprigman has succinctly identified two major problems
with this proposal.2 5 First, it would effectively lock up works of enduring value

118 Id.

nt See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
H.R. 2601 § 3(c)(1)(a).
121 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supranote
120

84.

122See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
123 William E. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinite#y Renewable Copyright,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471,
517 (2003). A similar proposal was made by Lawrence Lessig, who suggested a copyright term of
five years, renewable fifteen times. LESSIG, spra note 82, at 251.
124 Tilley, supra note 87.

125Sprigman, supra note 40, at 553.
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indefinitely."2 6 Under the proposal, Mickey Mouse would likely never enter the
public domain, as Disney would have the ability to renew its copyright on
"Steamboat Willie" in perpetuity. Similarly, works of enduring value, such as the
novels of William Faulkner, the paintings of Mark Rothko, or the films of Alfred
Hitchcock would be unlikely to ever enter the public domain. While most works
would enter the public domain earlier, many of our cultural cornerstones would
be unlikely to ever enter the public domain."' Second, this proposal would
require that the United States withdraw from the Berne Convention.'28 The
Berne Convention mandates that the initial term of copyright protection be no
less than the life of the author plus fifty years.' 29 This proposal stands in direct
opposition to the requirements of the Berne Convention and therefore represents
a complete reversal of the trend of copyright legislation. Despite its benefits, for
these reasons a system with a short copyright term remains untenable as a
solution to the problems posed by orphaned works.
3. Constructive Abandonment. Several solutions proposed to the Copyright
Office center around what can be best described as a theory of constructive
abandonment. A work may be abandoned under current copyright law by the
copyright owner; however, unlike with other areas of the law, in order to abandon
a copyright the owner must manifest an intention to surrender or abandon
copyright by an overt act. 3' No doctrine of constructive copyright abandonment
currently exists.'
Copyright owners who cease publishing or supporting their
works retain ownership so long as no overt act manifests an intention on their
part to abandon the copyright. 132 The failure to keep a work in print or object to
an infringing use does not constitute an "overt act" sufficient to effect an
abandonment.'33 In Hampton v. ParamountPictures, for example, the court held that
a copyright owner who failed to object to repeated instances of unlicensed public
performance of its work did not abandon its copyright.'
One proposal, submitted to the Copyright Office by Creative Commons and
Save the Music, would form a system of presumptive orphaning of works for

126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id

129 Berne Convention, supra note 38, art. 7(1).
"3

M.L. Cross, Annotation, Abandonment of Statutory Copyright, 84 A.L.R.2d 462, 464 (1962).

131 See id (stating that "abandonment of a statutory copyright must be 'manifested by some overt

act' indicative of a purpose to surrender the right and allow the public to copy" (quoting Hampton
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960))).
132

Id.

133

Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100,104 (9th Cit. 1960); Dodd, Mead & Co.

v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105, 107-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
134 Hampton, 279 F.2d at 105.
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failure to register.13 The proposal requires that copyright owners of published
works register their works within a twenty-five-year period following
publication.'36 Computer software would need to be registered within five years
of publication. 3 ' If a work is not registered within this initial period, it is moved
into "orphan status."'38 Orphan status does not completely abrogate copyright
protection; rather, "[r]ightsholders who fail to register their works would be
choosing to exploit their works through a lower-cost system of one-size-fits-a
default licenses with no need to identify a rightsholder and ask permission. '
Because owners are required to register their works and maintain current contact
information, a search of the registry would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of a "reasonable" inquiry to determine if a work has been orphaned.'"
Unpublished works under this proposal would be subject to a notice system
upon the death of the author.'
An author or his heirs may retain full rights by
registering the work at any time before three years after the author's death.'42
Corporate works are required to be registered within ten years of creation.'
If,
after a proper investigation, a potential user determines that the author is deceased
and the work was not registered within this time frame, the author may use the
work after publishing a notice of intention to use on a centrally administered
"Claim Your Orphan" database for a period of six months.'"
Professor Sprigman, one of the coauthors of the Creative Commons and Save
the Music proposal, advocated a similar system of "reformalization" in a 2004
article.' Under this system, as under the Creative Commons and Save the Music
proposal, the author of a work would have the ability to voluntarily register his
work for full copyright protection.'" If a work is not registered, then the work
will be subject to a license of somewhat less than full copyright protection 47 in
essence, a license similar to that offered by the Creative Commons.'48 Under

135Lawrence Lessig et al., Comments of: Creative Commons and Save the Music (Mar. 25,
2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0643-STM-CreativeCommons.pdf.
136 Id. at 16.
137 Id
138 Id.
139 Id at 17.
140Id
141 Id. at 18-19.
142
143

Id. at 19.
Id.

144 Id.
141

Sprigman, supra note 40, at 554-55.

146 Id.
147

id.

148

Id.
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Sprigman's system, the shift in the scope of copyright protection would be
irrevocable. 49
The Stanford University Libraries proposed a similar scheme, suggesting the
creation of a category of "Archive and Library Orphan Works" (ALOW). 50
Under this proposal, libraries and archives would be allowed to use out-of-print
works that were initially published at least twenty-eight years earlier and that the
copyright owner has not excluded from the program through an appropriate
notice with the Copyright Office.' This proposal remedies many aspects of the
current copyright law which prevent libraries and archives from properly
preserving their collections. It is tailored to solve the problems facing many
libraries, however, and would not adequately address the situations of most
ordinary users.
Although a properly conceived constructive abandonment system can provide
an adequate solution to many of the problems posed by orphaned works,
implementation remains unlikely. The requirement of registration within a
statutorily defined period works little more than an end-run around the
abrogation of formalities required to join the Berne Convention.'52 Although
adhering to statutory formalities may not be a prerequisite for initial copyright
protection under these proposals, registration is required for full copyright
protection. The trend in American copyright law for the past half century,
however, has been one of expanding protection and scope while lowering the
entrance requirements for copyright protection.'53 The proposals of Creative
andPrufessor Sprigman work a reversal of thlis trend.
Comilions, Save the Mic
Therefore, although a reversal may be advantageous, it is unlikely.
Beyond the practical problems with reintroducing formalities in a copyright
system averse to them, these proposals also lack the flexibility to deal with works
that lose value at widely divergent rates. Films and books may lose value slowly,
whereas computer software lose value quickly. To address this disparity, the point
in the copyright term at which the status of the copyright registration and
maintenance will be evaluated must be a midpoint between the two. Although a
constructive abandonment doctrine would be a reasonable addition to the current
copyright system, more flexible, case-by-case approaches exist which can better
accommodate this diversity.

149 Id
'" Comment of Michael A. Keller, Univ. Librarian, Stanford Univ., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc.
Register for Policy & Int'l Affairs, Copyright Office (Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/
orphan/comments/OW0457-StanfordUniversity.pdf.
151 Id

112 See

Berne Convention, supra note 38, art. 5(2) (mandating that "the enjoyment and the

exercise" of copyrights "shall not be subject to any formality").

113
See spra Part II.
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B. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS

1. FairUse. William Patry and Judge Richard Posner have also advocated an
adaptation of the fair use doctrine to prove a safe harbor for users of orphaned
works."s The fair use defense protects socially beneficial uses against the
1 55
tendency of copyright owners to attempt to retain any and all rights in the work.
Patry and Posner's argument is that the doctrine of fair use, properly conceived,
should allow for the uses of old works where the transaction costs of seeking
56
permission exceed the value of the license sought."
Any concern that this
doctrine would sweep too broadly in favor of users could be checked, according
to the authors, by the application of a "duty of reasonable inquiry.""'57 The duty
would require that the user exhaust economically efficient methods of
determining and contacting the copyright owner prior to making use of the
work. 15"

A completely judicial solution such as this would avoid any problems with
inconsistency between the term of full protection and the rate at which an
individual work loses value. This is especially important with works that lose their
value rapidly. It would allow the fact finder to take into account individual
aspects of the work, such as its history of publication, special aspects of any
transfers of ownership, and the particular character of the use, whether it be
educational, commercial, or for research which is likely to be socially beneficial.
These benefits, however, are outweighed by the transaction costs imposed by
such a system. Because every case must be decided individually, the level of
uncertainty requisite in this system will drive away potential users who lack the
resources to appear before a court for adjudication. A frequent reminder in the
Copyright Office roundtable discussions was that a system must be
comprehensible and easy for the end user, the person standing at the counter with
5 9
an old family photo."
The fair use solution does not pass this test. Even though
applying the doctrine of fair use provides great flexibility in application, it remains
only a defense to an infringement action. Although Patry and Posner note that
their suggestion provides "a legal safe harbor,"' 6 ° it is unclear how a defense to an
infringement suit provides the security which users need. Users require assurance

154 William F. Patty & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutoy Reform in the Wake fEldred, 92

CAL. L. REv. 1639, 1650 (2004).
155 Id. at 1646--50.
156 Id. at 1650.
157 Id.
158 Id.

159 See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 112, at 35 ("I think the solutions have got to be looked

at from the end consumer standpoint....").
6 Patty & Posner, supra note 154, at 1652.
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at the point of use. As the archivist Kenn Rabin noted in his comment to the
Copyright Office, "[s]ince Fair Use is only a defense if one is suedand not a defense
againstgettingsued, it is often of little use to filmmakers without major financial
resources. '16 Potential users will remain afraid to use orphaned works if they are
concerned about their ability to cover the attorney's fees required to defend
against an infringement suit. Although the doctrine of fair use may be able to
protect some uses of orphaned works, it cannot be a complete solution.
2. Limitaion of Remedies. The Copyright Office proposed a system of
limitations on remedies, or an "orphaned work defense," in its January 2006
Report on Orphan Works. 62 The statutory language suggested by the Copyright
Office was presented, with additions, before Congress in May 2006.163 Under this
system, a user who wishes to take advantage of the limitations on remedies must
perform a "good faith, reasonably diligent search" for the copyright owner prior
to use and provide attribution to the author and copyright owner."6 If the user
is sued for copyright infringement, upon a determination that the user meets the
statutory requirement, the court may only award "reasonable compensation" for
the use.' 65 If, however, the use is personal and without any "direct or indirect
commercial advantage," and the user immediately ceases the use upon receiving
66
notice of infringement, the court may not award any monetary damages.
Injunctive relief is limited as well. 67 Where the use of the copyrighted work is
transformative, the copyright owner cannot obtain an injunction if the user
provides reasonable compensation and attribution. 68 The copyright owner is
entitled to injunctive relief in other situations, but the terms of the injunction
should "to the extent practicable account for any harm that the relief would cause
the infringer due to the infringer's reliance on this section in making the infringing
169
use."
This system answers many concerns raised to the Copyright Office, but
ultimately also fails to provide the preemptive certainty necessary to prevent self-

161 Comment of Kenn Rabin tojule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int'l Affairs, Copyright
Office (Feb. 4,2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0030-FMS.pdf.
162 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 32, at 127.
The bill clarified what
163 Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006).

constitutes a "reasonably diligent" search, id. § 2(a)(a)(2)(B), and provided for the Copyright Office
to assemble information to assist users in conducting such a search, id. § 2(a)(a)(2)(C). The bill also

created additional liability for users who fail to negotiate in good faith. Id. § 2(a)(b)(1)(B)(ii).
164 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS,
165

Id.

166

Id.

supra note 32, at 127.

167 Id.
168 Id.
169

Id.
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censorship. As with the proposal for expanded fair use,17 ° the Copyright Office
statutory language provides a defense to an infringement action. Any system that
relies upon a defense to infringement presents a sizable risk of chilling use, as
users are unwilling to risk the possibility of a lawsuit, even if they would be likely
to prevail.'71 Further, as noted previously, a judicial system presents the potential
for uneven application, as courts' determinations of what constitutes a
"reasonable diligent search" may differ. With this level of uncertainty, it would
not be surprising if many users, fearful of the potential for liability and the costs
associated with defending against infringement, simply abandon any attempt to
make use of an orphaned work. A statutory or regulatory mechanism that will
provide preliminary assurance to users is required.
IV. A COMPULSORY

LICENSING MODEL

Another means by which orphaned works can be made available for use is
Under a compulsory
through the mechanism of the compulsory license.
licensing system for orphaned works, once a work is determined to be orphaned,
the user would be able to apply to the Copyright Office or an independent agency
for a license. A license to use the work in the manner specified in the application
would then be granted upon payment of a predetermined license fee. The license
fee, which could be set to a reasonable royalty predetermined by the Copyright
Office, could then be set aside in an escrow fund in case the copyright owner
reasserts his rights to the work.
A similar system is currently in place in Canada. Under section 70.7 of the
Canadian Copyright Act, if a potential user has conducted a reasonable search for
the copyright owner and has been unable to determine ownership of the work,
the user can apply to the Canadian Copyright Board for a license. 72 The
Canadian law does not make allowances for situations where the copyright owner
has been located, but the potential user is unable to negotiate efficiently for the
right to use the work. 73 The works and uses for which the Copyright Board can
issue a license are set by statute. 74 If the Copyright Board is satisfied that the user
has made an unsuccessful, but reasonable, effort to locate the owner and the use
Board will set a fee for the use and issue a
is reasonable, the Copyright
75
nonexclusive license.
170See supra Part III.B. 1.
171 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
172 Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, s. 70.7 (1985).
173

Id.

174 Id

' Id.; Copyright Board of Canada, Unlocatable Copyright Owners Brochure, http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/unlocatable/brochure-e.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
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Japan has also implemented a compulsory licensing system for works where
the copyright owner is unlocatable" 6 Unlike the Canadian system, however, the
Japanese system provides for arbitration when a user who wishes to broadcast a
published work or make and distribute phonograph records of a work is unable
to negotiate with the copyright owner.'77 The Japanese law also provides for
arbitration when the user attempts negotiation but fails to reach an agreement
with the copyright owner.'
In each instance the user must pay a reasonable
royalty set by the Commissioner for the use of the work.179
The compulsory license is not a foreign concept to American copyright law.
80
Compulsory licensing is currently used in the United States for cable television
and musical works. 8' For musical works, if a person wishes to record a song, as
with a "cover version," they may do so upon payment of a set fee to a collective
licensing agency, such as the Harry Fox Agency, or to the copyright holder.'82
The license fee is predetermined and applies to all works regardless of the
author. 3 This applies only to new recordings of underlying musical works,
however; if a user wishes to incorporate a sound recording into a later work or
change the basic structure of a musical work, the user must negotiate with the
copyright owner for a license for that use."M However, even with this restriction,
te system still allows for a great deal of creativity. Cover versions of songs can
reinterpret a song without making changes substantial enough to qualify as a
change to the "basic structure" for which permission is required.8 A use that is
more transformative, however, may require negotiation with the copyright
owner." 6 An example of this is the story of the Beastie Boys' attempted cover of
the Beatles' song "I'm Down."'8 7 The Beastie Boys' version changed the lyrics
and many aspects of the basic structure and melody of the song, effectively
creating a derivative work.' The copyright owner, MichaelJackson, objected to

176 Chosakuken

Ho [Copyright Law], Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 67, translatedin 2 COPYRIGHT

LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (comp. by UNESCO 2000).
177 Id. arts. 68-69.
178
179

Id.

Id art. 67.

ISO
17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
1"1 Id

§ 115.

Id
183 Id.
182

184

JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUsIC:

How INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AFFECTS

MusicAL CREATIVITY 40 (2006).
185 Id.
186
187

Id.
David Okamoto, 'Coversongs':The Play-it-againSham, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs,July 5, 1988, at

1D.
188 Id.
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this adaptation of the underlying musical work, and the song was not released. 8 9
This situation is a relative rarity, however; less transformative works are subject
to compulsory licensing, while more transformative works may fall under the
protection of the fair use doctrine. 9 '
The creation of a compulsory license for orphaned works would also require
the creation of an adjudicatory body authorized to hear applications for licenses
and judge disputes between copyright owners and users. This body could either
exist under the auspices of the Copyright Office or the power could be vested in
an approved third party collective licensing organization, such as the Harry Fox
Agency. Although this would result in adding a level of bureaucracy to the
copyright system, the potential advantages outweigh this disadvantage.
Under a compulsory licensing system for orphaned works, the use is licensed
and approved prior to the actual use, resolving any uncertainty on the part of the
user. This system assures the user that the use is not infringing upon payment of
the statutory fee. Further, because each use must be approved, the Copyright
Office can use this system to build a registry of works for which licenses have
been granted. This system can then be used to determine which works can be
moved to an "orphaned status" similar to those suggested under the constructive
abandonment proposals. Once a user has conducted a reasonable efforts search,
failed to locate a copyright owner, and the Copyright Office has agreed that the
owner is unlocatable, the work may be declared orphaned and registered as an
orphaned work. Until the copyright owner comes forward to assert ownership,
any future users who wish to apply to use the work may do so without duplicating
the reasonable efforts search of the initial owner. Further, once the copyright
owner has reappeared, full copyright protection may be reestablished; however,
the uses that have already been licensed will be allowed to continue. Any future
uses, such as reproduction or the creation of derivative works, would require the
permission of the copyright owner.
This system presents several distinct advantages over the other systems
previously proposed. First, a compulsory licensing system provides the user with
a simple, cost-effective arbitration prior to use, providing much needed
reassurance that no unknown claimant will attempt to assert copyright privileges
at a later date. Second, issuing a compulsory license to use a work need not
change the fundamental character of the underlying copyright protection. Under
the constructive abandonment proposals, works that are determined to be
abandoned by the copyright owner are shifted to orphan status. Upon reassertion
of copyright ownership under a compulsory licensing system, however, the owner
may regain full copyright protection, except with regard to those uses licensed
189 Id.

190DEMERS,

smpra note 184.
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while the work was orphaned. Third, a compulsory licensing system allows users
access to orphaned works while maintaining compliance with the requirements
of the Berne Convention. A compulsory licensing system requires no formalities
for the establishment of full copyright protection upon fixation of a work. The
only impact of a determination of orphan status would be that the Copyright
Office would have the authority to grant a non-exclusive license to use the work
and collect a fee for the use, which may be turned over to the copyright owner
when he reasserts his ownership.
V. CONCLUSION

Each system of access provision has advantages and disadvantages. A
modification of the fair use doctrine has the advantage of flexibility, as it would
be on a case-by-case basis without the need for recourse to Congress, which is
more susceptible to lobbying from the copyright industries. On the other hand,
a judicial solution has the noted disadvantage of initial uncertainty and is subject
to later change with little to no warning. Absent direction from the Supreme
Court, adoption of a judicial refraining of the fair use defense would not be
nationwide, resulting in disparate copyright law in different jurisdictions. Users
want certainty; they want to be assured that their use of a copyrighted work will
not subject them to later legal consequences. Because it fails to provide this
assurance, the fair use defense cannot function as an adequate solution to the
problems posed by orphaned works.
Similarly, the PDEA cannot function as a comprehensive solution. A solution
to the problems posed by orphaned works must be able to address works that
become orphaned at any point in the copyright term; the PDEA only adequately
addresses works which are orphaned around the fifty-year mark. This leaves a
term which is too long to be able to provide access to works that are orphaned
quickly and deteriorate rapidly. The PDEA provides a potential limit on the most
excessive tendencies of the CTEA; however, it cannot function as the sole
mechanism by which access to orphaned works is assured.
Constructive abandonment proposals seek to create a system that reintroduces
some "old-style" copyright formalities. Although a constructive abandonment
proposal would assure that the copyright owner either actively maintains
copyright registration or loses protection, the requirements would likely be seen
as too onerous for copyright owners. The United States has consistently rid itself
of barriers to copyright protection over the past half-century; it is unlikely that
these barriers will be reintroduced when they are shifted to another point in the
copyright term.
A compulsory licensing system similar to that in place in Canada and Japan
remains the most efficient and effective means to provide access to orphaned
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works. This system has three distinct advantages. First, it is flexible, as it
addresses each work and use as it appears. If a work is orphaned one year after
creation, a compulsory licensing system would be able to allow use of that work.
Second, it requires no major change to the overall system of copyright protection.
Because each work and use is handled on a case-by-case basis, the system can take
into account all of the complexities and idiosyncrasies of every particular case,
while avoiding a wholesale change in the copyright system that would be
unpalatable to Congress and lobbyists for the copyright industries. Finally, a
compulsory licensing system would move works to an easily reversible orphan
status; because there is no major shift in the duration or scope of copyright
protection that accompanies a compulsory licensing, the copyright owner can
reassert full protection and be assured of retaining the remainder of his rights
under current law.
As the current trend toward lengthy copyright terms shows no sign of change,
it is imperative that we provide for access to orphan works. Works that the
copyright owner has abandoned may not be commercially viable, but they contain
vital pieces of our cultural history which should be preserved. A system that
provides access to orphaned works will allow libraries and archives to preserve
them for future generations, scholars to use them in research, artists and writers
to incorporate them into their own new creations, and the public to have access
to our full cultural history.
PAMELA BRANNON
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